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WHY DO JURIES GET A BUM RAP? REFLECTIONS
ON THE WORK OF VALERIE HANS
Richard Lempert*

The paper by Professor Valerie Hans that I have been asked to
comment on examines the widespread expectation that jurors are prepared to hold businesses responsible in tort actions when they would
not hold individual actors similarly responsible.1 Two reasons are
commonly offered for this expectation. The first is that jurors naturally sympathize with individuals (like themselves) when people sue
businesses, either because they identify with the plaintiffs as individuals or because they hold antibusiness attitudes. The second is that because businesses are often wealthy, a "deep pockets" effect exists such
that jurors in negligence cases will find for undeserving plaintiffs or
will give plaintiffs who should prevail more money than they deserve
because the defendant is a large business and "can afford it." Professor Hans' research, and work by others that she reviews calls these
assumptions into question.
Professor Hans reports results from several strands of her research
that allow her to bring to bear diverse data on the problem she addresses. In addition to her work, which uses experimental methods,
interviews with real jurors following actual trials, and judicial assessments of jury verdicts, Professor Hans cites public opinion poll data
and archival research by others on jury verdicts. This wide-ranging
research converges on three findings. First, there is no evidence that
Americans generally hold heated anti-business attitudes; 2 second, the
evidence for a defendant's wealth effect is weak and anecdotal; 3 pure
wealth effects are not found; 4 and third, large corporations probably
lose some negligence cases that individual defendants would win, but
this is because corporations are seen as having a capacity and hence a
* Richard Lempert is a Francis A. Allen Professor of Law and Professor of Sociology at the
University of Michigan. He is on leave during the 1998-99 academic year at the Russell Sage
Foundation. Work on this paper was supported by the Russell Sage Foundation and by the Cook
Funds of the University of Michigan.
1. Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of Corporate Defendants,

48 DEPAUL L. REv. 327 (1999).
2. Id. at 331-33.
3. Id. at 346.
4. Id.
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responsibility to foresee and avoid harms that individuals lack. 5 Thus,
any apparent biases against businesses in jury verdict studies are likely
to reflect not counternormative biases and wealth effects but rather
normatively defensible judgements about the different capacities of
businesses and individuals to foresee and avoid harm. Hence, the
business disadvantage in litigation seems attributable neither to negative attitudes toward businesses nor to an inappropriate identification
with parties who are individuals, but rather to attitudes that reflect a
special faith in the capacity of businesses to avoid harm. It seems,
ironically, that a rather favorable view of business rather than an unfavorable one is at the root of any disadvantages businesses suffer in
disputes with individual tort litigants. It has been said that one of the
problems in punishing business crime is that businesses have no soul
6
to damn. This may be true, but businesses also have no face to hate.
I have no criticisms of Professor Hans' symposium article, nor do I
dispute her conclusions. Her study is well done, and she fairly interprets her data. The picture her research paints is similar to what other
leading students of the jury report. Generally speaking, the jury performs its task well, particularly the task of fairly finding facts. Bias
does not seem to be a great problem in jury verdicts. Professors
Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, in their seminal study, found that
judges agreed with juror verdicts in more than three-quarters of the
cases they heard, 7 and where they disagreed, the cases were ordinarily
close on the facts.8 In only a few cases did judges feel that juror attitudes were strongly determinative of their verdicts. 9 Recent surveys
convey a similar picture. In a poll carried out by Louis Harris and
Associates, 99% of federal judges and 98% of state judges believed
that jurors made a serious effort to apply the law and 80% of federal
judges and 69% of state judges rejected the idea that "the feelings of
the jurors about the parties often cause them to make inappropriate
decisions." 10 A survey of Georgia state judges reports that 87% of the
time judges agreed with civil juries verdicts in negligence cases, and
5. Id. at 335-36.
6. Significantly, the major expressions of anti-jury bias that Professor Hans describes in the
forthcoming book from which the paper here is drawn involve small businesses that were personified by those who owned them. Valerie Hans, Business on Trial: The Civil Jury and Corporate Responsibility (unpublished manuscript, on file with Valerie P. Hans).
7. HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 56-57 (1966).

8. Id. at 104-17.
9. Id. at 428-33.
10. Louis HARRIS & Assocs.,

JUDGES' OPINIONS ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES: A SURVEY OF

STATE AND FEDERAL TRIAL JUDGES WHO SPEND AT LEAST HALF THEIR TIME ON GENERAL

CIVIL CASES 76, 79-80 (1987); see John Setear, Comments on Judges' Opinions on Procedural
Issues, 69 B.U. L. REV. 765, 775 (1989) (discussing the poll results further).
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when there was disagreement, only 19% of judges indicated that it
was their belief that the jury was pro-plaintiff. 1 Consistent with Professor Hans' findings, various studies find little or no support for the
view that juries are hostile to corporations, doctors, or other defendants with deep pockets. 12 Indeed, a number of studies report that jurors and jury eligible citizens believe plaintiffs bring frivolous law suits
or have other attitudes that should favor defense rather than plaintiff
13
verdicts.
Overall the social science evidence does not mean we should discard the notion that general jury attitudes-like attitudes toward big
business or sympathy for "little guys"-influence jury verdicts, but if
attitudes like these bear on verdicts, their bearing is ordinarily small
and may be proxying for mind sets that affect how evidence is perceived and not other kinds of bias. Thus, the interesting question may
not be, do juror attitudes bear on verdicts, but rather why-contrary
to most social science evidence-do people, including lawyers and the
press, persist in believing that juror attitudes toward institutions like
businesses have a strong effect on jury decisions. Let me suggest some
possible reasons.
First, there is what has been called, the fundamental attribution error:' 4 In explaining the actions of another, particularly untoward actions, we attribute more responsibility to the person's characteristics
and less to the person's circumstances than we should. If the attribution error applies when we look at jury verdicts, and there is no reason
why it should not, there will be a natural tendency to attribute verdicts
more to the supposed dispositions and attitudes of jurors than to their
circumstances, which are being in court, hearing a particular case and
being instructed on legal rules. This tendency is, no doubt, fostered by
cases in which the public gets only part of the story. If the media
present a story which suggests just one verdict makes sense and the
jury reaches a different verdict, it is hard to attribute the verdict to
11. Perry R. Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the Bench, 26 GA.
L. REV. 85, 116 tbl.1 (1991). In a later study, Sentell found that federal judges had similar views.
Perry R. Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the (Federal) Bench, 27
GA. L. REV. 59 (1992).

12.

NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE

MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS

191-220 (1995); Robert MacCoun, Differential Treatment of CorporateDefendants by Juries:An
Examination of the "Deep Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 L. & Soc'v REV. 121, 125-43 (1996).
13. VIDMAR, supra note 12, at 169-71; Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors' Judge-

ments of Business Liability in Tort Cases: Implicationsfor the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L.
& Soc'Y REV. 85, 93-107 (1992).
14. RICHARD NISBET & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS IN
SOCIAL JUDGEMENT

(1980).
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anything other than juror shortcomings, like an inability to comprehend the evidence or bias. This is especially likely if the media foregrounds possible sources of jury bias. For example, if people were
polled on their knowledge of the two O.J. Simpson trials, it would not
be surprising if more people remembered that the jury in the criminal
case, which found Simpson not guilty, was largely black while the jury
in the civil trial, which found Simpson liable in a wrongful death action, was largely white, than remembered the evidentiary differences
in the two cases or the fact that the cases were decided under different
burdens of proof.
The tendency to make attributions of this sort is, of course, not limited to juries. About the time I delivered the remarks on which this
paper is based, some then good news for President Clinton provided a
nice example. Judge Wright threw out the civil suit brought against
him by Paula Jones. 15 People were puzzled because she was a Bush
appointee, but news reports, trying to make sense of the decision,
pointed out that she had been in a class on the Law of the Sea that
16
President Clinton taught during his brief stint as a law professor.
What received less prominent attention, at least initially in the reports
I read and heard, was the law the judge was applying. Even lawyers
professed astonishment at what Judge Wright had done, but they
seemed to be astonished not so much because they felt her decision
was inconsistent with law and precedent, but rather because they had
doubted that a judge would take the responsibility of throwing out
such a high profile case. 17 Later some commentators noted that Judge
Wright had originally decided that the President should not be tried
while in office.' 8 The implication of this observation was that a consistent pro-Clinton bias motivated her decisions. Lost in the press accounts was the possibility that good faith and independent readings of
the law informed these different decisions. I am not arguing that the
attribution of bias to Judge Wright was wrong. I do not know. Rather
I am saying that the attribution is a natural one for any person who
disagrees with a legal decision, whether by judge or jury, to make.
Enhancing or channeling the normal tendency to make the fundamental attribution error when explaining jury verdicts are popular
15. See, e.g., Peter Barker, Judge Finds 'No Genuine Issues for Trial,' WASH. POST, Apr. 2,
1998, at Al.
16. See, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, Day of Deliverance, TIME, Apr. 13, 1998, at 44, 46.
17. See, e.g., Harvey Berkman, Student of Prof. Clinton Will Judge His Lawsuit, NAT'L L.J.,
June 6, 1994, at A12; Robert J.Caldwell, Clinton's Victory: A Big Win, but Still Far From Exoneration, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 5,1998, at Gl.
18. See, e.g., Bill Sammon, Decision Ensures Trial Won't Occur During Presidency, WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at Al.
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narratives that make bias a particularly plausible explanation for particular jury decisions and for jury decisions in general. Two kinds of
narratives may play a role. One is a bias story: people tend to stick up
for those who are like them with respect to race, gender, or other
relevant characteristics. Therefore, if a black inner city jury acquits a
black youth charged with distributing drugs, a ready explanation is
that this is most likely due to a sense of racial solidarity rather than to
the jury's reasonably concluding, after hearing all the evidence, that
the arresting officer may have planted drugs on the defendant to help
explain the brutality of an arrest. A similar view that likeness has
created bias is available to explain any verdict for an individual suing
a business. The jurors are, after all, the plaintiff's peers.
More interesting, however, is the recognition of the power of narrative. People recognize that there are stories out there about such
things as the badness of big business or the violence proneness of
blacks and Hispanics as well as the widely diffused Robin Hood story,
which makes it noble to take from the rich and give to the poor, and
they tell plausible stories about how these stories are likely to affect
jury verdicts. Thus, the losing lawyer might explain a particularly
large verdict against a business client with the remark, "The jury was
playing Robin Hood."
Yet some of those narratives, like the "big business is bad" narrative
may not be as widespread or generalized across businesses as people
might think. As with the "Robin Hood" story in an age of "welfare
reform" that threatens to cut subsistence payments to the poor and
promises tax cuts for the rich, the "big business is bad" story is perhaps dated. Although it may have been a powerful popular motif in
the Grange and trustbusting days of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, or in the union organizing days of the 1930s, after
a major war in which our industrial might saved the world from Nazism and a cold war in which capitalism triumphed over communism,
the "big business is bad" narrative may have far shallower cultural
roots than it once did. Certainly Professor Hans' data suggests its
roots are shallow, even though they say nothing about whether they
were ever deep. Moreover, Professor Hans finds that powerful competing narratives, like the "greedy plaintiff" story, exist. If stories like
this have any effect, they should bias juries in favor of business defendants. But even if the "big business is bad" narrative does not resonate with most people (of the kind who sit on juries), the rhetoric of
consumer activists like Ralph Nader, of certain environmental groups
and of some labor and other leaders makes the "big business is bad"
story an available one that is easy to draw on as an explanation for
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high punitive damage awards or other seemingly anti-business
verdicts.
Interacting with these two psychological reasons that may explain
our proneness to attribute unpopular verdicts to the biases or irrationability of juries is a material reason. Both individuals and organizations have strong incentives to blame jury verdicts they do not like on
juror failings rather than on the facts and law of the cases juries hear.
Losing lawyers have an obvious incentive to do this, for if juror attitudes or jury incompetence do not explain a jury's verdict, other obvious explanations are that the lawyer did a poor job with a winning
case or the lawyer had a losing case, which also means the lawyer did a
poor job because lawyers with losing cases should advise clients to
settle. Moreover, defense lawyers have a greater incentive than plaintiff's lawyers to blame defeats on the jury. Defense attorneys represent repeat players, like manufacturers and insurance companies. If
their clients are dissatisfied by a string of losses, defense attorneys
may be replaced as business counsel. Plaintiff's lawyers are more
likely to represent one-time litigants. They have less need to justify
their losses to clients since they do not depend on their clients' repeat
business.
In addition to the desire to justify defeats, plaintiff's and defense
lawyers both have other reasons to attribute jury verdicts to the attitudes or irrationality of juries. Lawyers, in selling themselves to clients may, for example, claim they can pick juries with favorable
biases, and lawyers can point to the possibility of jury irrationality in
attempting to persuade clients who feel justice is on their side to settle
on terms the lawyers want to achieve.
There are also powerful interests that have-or think they have because they buy into biased jury stories-incentives to attack the jury
system and jurors as biased or irrational. Many organizations that are
repeat players in the litigation process seem to believe either that juries are out to get them because of what they are or that juries favor
the "little guys." They have reason to promote stories of jury bias or
incompetence as part of a long term campaign to limit the power of
juries and a shorter run effort to influence the votes of citizens who
might serve on juries. The same is true of organizations that may feel
they might bring political pressure to bear on the selection of judgesincluding substantial contributions in states where judges are
elected-that they cannot bring to bear on juries. Thus, the Exxon
Corporation, following the $5 billion punitive damage verdict against
it in the Exxon Valdez oil spill case invested substantial sums in a series of studies designed to show that juries cannot competently and
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fairly set punitive damages. 19 One would not expect them to be less
shy about investing in judicial elections if the demise of the jury system meant more was at stake.
Insurance companies have taken out ads designed to spread socalled juror horror stories. Those who have pursued the underlying
stories have shown that when the case facts are appreciated the eleirrament of horror-which is to say the suggestion of jury bias and
20
tionality-is generally diminished substantially or disappears.
Tort defense organizations also promote such stories, and the media
seem to delight in spreading them. The most recent celebrated example of what is wrong with the jury system is the so-called McDonald's
coffee incident in which a jury gave a $2.7 million punitive damage
award to a seventy-nine-year-old woman, Stella Liebeck, who was
21
burned when she spilled a hot cup of McDonald's coffee on herself.
The story, as originally portrayed in press accounts and on the evening
news, symbolized plaintiff greed and seemed like strong evidence of a
jury system run amok. Only after the initial story had cemented these
images in people's minds was it reported, with much less publicity,
that McDonald's kept its coffee about twenty degrees hotter than
other fast food restaurants,2 2 that it had had over 700 coffee burn
complaints during the previous year but had not ordered its franchisees to turn down the heat on their coffee, 23 that the car Ms. Liebeck

was in was parked when she spilled the coffee, that Ms. Liebeck's
burns were serious enough to require hospitalization and for her
daughter, a nurse, to take a week off from work to care for her,24 and
that McDonald's had refused Ms. Liebeck's original offer to settle for
her hospital and medical expenses of $8,000 (McDonald's offered
$800) as well as later opportunities to settle, or to accept an arbitrator's award, for sums far less than the eventual verdict. 25 Much of this
19. See, e.g., Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance As a Risk Manager, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 901 (1998); Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage
and ErraticAwards: The Psychology of Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998);
Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in
Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998).
20. Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENv. U. L.
REV. 77, 77 (1993); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REv.
1093, 1109-12 (1996); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the
Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1253 (1992).
21. Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a Jury Decided That a Coffee Spill is Worth $2.9
Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at Al.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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information was in a press release Ms. Liebeck's attorney made available after the verdict, but it was not picked up when the case was first
reported and might not be known today if an enterprising Wall Street
Journal reporter had not decided to find out how a jury could render
what appeared to be so outrageous a verdict.
Stories like the original McDonald's story shape elite as well as popular images of how juries perform and what motivates jury verdicts.
This is because they both reflect and reinforce extant narratives, like
the "big business is bad" or "Robin Hood" narratives. These stories
can be seen as explanations for what juries do even when they have
nothing ot do with the jury's final decision. In the McDonald's case,
to return to the example, several jurors later said that when they
heard the bare facts of the case on voir dire, they wanted to be on the
jury so that they could make a strong statement about greed and responsibility by denying recovery.
In short, popular views of the degree to which juries are motivated
by biases or fail to understand evidence clash dramatically with what
social science research on juries reveals, and the cases cited anecdotally to support these views often stand for very different propositions
than that which they appear to establish. Juries are more or less random samples of ordinary people. Usually there is little reason to think
that the ordinary people who learn of what appears to be an outrageous jury verdict would have decided differently had they been the
jurors in the case, and, conversely, the jurors who heard the case probably would have regarded their verdict as a sign of a jury system run
amuck had they been exposed to news stories about the case rather
than to the case itself.
To those who study juries most closely, Professor Hans' findings will
not be at all surprising, for jury researchers generally find that juries
perform most tasks entrusted to them well.2 6 Indeed, most people
who study the jury closely end up as strong supporters of the institution. This, of course raises another possible explanation for the disjunction between what jury research tells us and popular views of the
jury. Maybe the jury is studied largely by its fans, whose respect for
the jury colors what they find. There may be something to this, for a
commitment to the value of the jury as a democratic institution can
26. The major weakness revealed by empirical work on the jury is difficulty in understanding
and following instructions. These difficulties seem attributable more to the way jury instructions
are written and to practices regarding jury instructions than to intentional noncompliance or the
intellectual deficiencies of juries. Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable,A Psycholingusitic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306,
1309 (1979).
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affect how a researcher writes an article. 27 But this does not explain
Professor Hans' data. The methods she uses are well-suited to the
problem she is studying, and several different approaches, as well as
research by others, converge on essentially the same picture. Nor do I
think that jury researchers' values explain the generally favorable picture that most empirical investigations of the jury reveals. The jury
researchers I know are, first, committed social scientists. Many are
excellent methodologists, and when juries fall down in various respects, these data are reported.
Overall, I think the disjunction between popular images of juries as
biased and/or incompetent and what the social science evidence tells
us reflects the kinds of psychological processes and media manipulation I discuss. But the reader should realize that my discussion is
speculative. While the reasons I have identified for the disjunction
between social science and popular images of the jury are plausible, I
cannot claim to have proven what is going on. Indeed, I do not even
claim that what I call the popular image of the jury is the dominant
image among the population. All I claim is that it is one that has
considerable currency and figures heavily in legal and political debates. Nor do I claim that anti-business biases or cavalier attitudes
toward imposing costs on those with deep pockets do not determine
some jury verdicts. Certainly jury attitudes, including general attitudes like hostility towards big business, can influence the votes of
jurors just as their idiosyncratic experiences can influence their votes,
and in individual cases anything can happen.
We should, however, recognize that judges or other alternative triers of fact also have attitudes that can affect their judgements, because
this is part of what it is to be human. Given the ubiquity of potentially
case-relevant attitudes, there are substantial reasons to prefer the influence of juror attitudes on verdicts to that of judicial ones. First,
juries decide as a group. Juror attitudes differ and can cancel each
other out. Trial judges hear only one voice, their own. Second, jurors
27. If I can use myself as an example, my article, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock
After Twelve Years, concludes that despite the difficulties juries have handling complex cases
there seems to be no fundamental problem with entrusting the jury with such cases that could
not be ameliorated by handling such cases differently or that could be cured by giving such cases
to trial judges. Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve
Years, in VERDICr: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181, 247 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). A

researcher less committed than I to the jury system and the democratic values it enshrines might
have drawn a different picture from the empirical evidence I had available, which showed juries
often performing well but in some cases making serious mistakes. A different person might
perhaps have not called attention to the need always to compare juries with judges or might not
have emphasized the possibility that changes in how we treat juries in complex cases could increase the jury's ability to understand the case.
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hear one case and then disperse. Judges, in the absence of juries,
would hear case after case. If jurors in a case share an attitude so
strong that it biases their decision, it is only one case which is affected.
If a judge has an attitude so strong it biases her decisions, that attitude
can improperly affect a string of cases. Finally, and most importantly,
jurors seldom get where they are because of their attitudes. Although
lawyers strive to get juries favorably disposed to them, it is hard to
accurately discern case-relevant juror attitudes, and no juror can be
retained because of a favorable attitude. A juror can only, within the
limits of the available peremptory challenges, be rejected because of
seemingly unfavorable views. Judges, by contrast, are chosen through
a political process in which their attitude may figure prominently.
Without the jury, judicial attitudes would be yet more important to
decisions in cases, and wealthy repeat player litigants would have reason to spend lavishly to influence the selection of even low level trial
judges.
Let me close with what is perhaps the best news about juries, news
consistent with what Professor Hans' work tells us. If there is any
single finding that stands out in the thirty-two years of modern social
science research on juries, beginning with The American Jury,28 it is
that case facts are the most important determinant of jury verdicts.
Ordinarily their influence dwarfs everything else. This is exactly as it
should be.

28. KALVEN &

ZEISEL,

supra note 7.

